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I. INTRODUCTION
The movement of personal data across national borders is fundamental to
the Internet economy.' Yet the laws that govern such data flows remain national
or, at best, regional. 2 This mismatch creates a number of related problems. It
makes it difficult to track and enforce compliance as personal data moves
rapidly and unpredictably from one legal jurisdiction to another. 3 It increases
costs and risks for businesses that must track, and seek to comply with, a wide
variety of privacy laws.4 And it creates tension and political strife between
major trading partners, such as the United States and the European Union
(E.U.), whose differing approaches to privacy law threaten to disrupt data
transfers across their borders. 5 The Department of Commerce has identified the
conflict between global data flows and national or regional laws as one of the
most significant problems facing privacy law and policy today, explaining that
"[d]isparate approaches to commercial data privacy can create barriers to both
trade and commerce, harming both consumers and companies." 6
There may be a relatively simple and elegant solution to this problem:
internationally approved, industry codes of conduct. The solution would work
as follows. An industry sector would draft a privacy code of conduct that
fulfilled the core requirements of the E.U.'s 1995 Data Protection Directive, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's Privacy Principles and,
perhaps, other regional privacy regimes. It would then submit the code to the
relevant authority in each such regional jurisdiction. If the authority approved
the code, firms that complied with it would know that their activities met the
legal requirements for that jurisdiction (the E.U., the APEC nations, etc.). A
single industry code of conduct, approved in each of these regional
jurisdictions, would be able to function as a nearly global set of privacy rules
for that sector.
This Article is not alone in looking to industry codes of conduct as a
potential solution to the privacy problems associated with international data
I See generally PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, THE PRIVACY PROJECTS, MANAGING GLOBAL
DATA PRIVACY: CROSS-BORDER INFORMATION FLOWS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT
(2009) (describing commercial data transfers across national borders).
2 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1336-39 (2000) (describing the conflict between
international data flows and national laws).
3 See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
6 INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY
AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK 53 (2010)
[hereinafter DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY].
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flows. Policymakers in Europe, Asia and the United States have also been using
industry codes to address this issue: The E.U. through its Binding Corporate
Rules (BCR) initiative; the APEC forum through its Cross-border Privacy Rules
program; and the United States and E.U. through their Safe Harbor Agreement.7
Each of these important initiatives employs codes of conduct as a means to
create cross-border privacy rules.8
This Article's approach differs from these existing initiatives in a critical
way. Each of the programs just named uses codes of conduct created at the level
of the individual firm, rather than at the level of the industry sector. This
weakens these efforts. It renders the code of conduct approach impractical for
most companies, expensive for governments to administer and enforce, and
difficult for stakeholder groups to track and monitor. This Article identifies an
alternative approach-sector-based codes of conduct (i.e., codes created at the
level of the industry sector)-and explains why it avoids the problems just
mentioned and holds the most promise going forward. It then identifies the legal
reforms needed to make this approach work.
Part II of the Article describes the huge growth in international data flows,
the ways in which they conflict with national and regional privacy laws, and the
challenges that this creates for privacy protection, commerce, and international
relations. Part III draws on regulatory theory to assess whether direct
government regulation (i.e., treaties implemented through national law), pure
industry self-regulation, or enforceable codes of conduct are best suited to
address this problem. In so doing, it sheds light on the advantages of the code of
conduct approach and why policymakers and industry have become so focused
on it. Part IV evaluates the existing code of conduct initiatives-Binding
Corporate Rules, APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules, and the U.S.-E.U. Safe
Harbor Agreement. It explains that each of these initiatives focuses on firm-
based codes of conduct (i.e., codes negotiated at the level of the individual
firm), and that this reduces their effectiveness. It argues that sector-based, cross-
border codes of conduct would work much better. Part V analyzes whether
existing legal mechanisms can support cross-border, sector-based codes of
conduct. It shows that many of the necessary pieces are already in place. It
identifies the legal reforms that will be needed to make this approach work.
II. GLOBAL DATA FLOWS, NATIONAL PRIVACY LAWS, AND THE PROBLEMS
THEY CREATE FOR ONE ANOTHER
Technology leaps forward and changes social realities. The law evolves
slowly to address these new challenges. For a time, there is a mismatch between
technology and society on the one hand, and law on the other. Eventually, the
7 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B, IV.C.
8 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B, IV.C.
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law adapts to the new realities. This is an old story, repeated in many contexts. 9
The rise of global data flows, and their conflict with slow-changing national and
regional privacy laws, is this story on steroids. The establishment of the
Internet, and the consequent increase in cross-border data transfers, has been
dizzying in its speed, size and complexity. The disjunction between this rapidly
expanding global data network, and the national and regional laws that seek to
govern it, is profound and problematic.
A. Global Data Flows
The World Wide Web (www) is just that. It creates a global architecture for
the transfer of digital data that does not respect national or regional
boundaries.' 0 It should not be surprising, then, that the emergence of the
Internet and, subsequently, the Cloud," have exponentially increased the speed,
and decreased the cost, of cross-border transfers of personal data. As Professor
Paul Schwartz has explained, this has led to three, related changes in data
processing.12
First, it has increasingly made data processing into a cross-border affair.
Prior to the rise of the Internet, most data processing data took place within the
boundaries of a single nation. 13 The transfer of data across national borders was
"an occasional event, an exception and not the rule."' 4 Today, cross-border data
transfers are ubiquitous.' 5 The low cost of international data transfer has
allowed companies to locate operations, and develop relationships with other
businesses and customers, throughout the world.16 They then collect personal
data from, and/or share data with, each of these individuals or entities. 17
International data transfers and economic globalization build on and reinforce
one another. Fast, cheap, and reliable international data transfers support the
9 See Dennis D. Hirsch, Introduction: The Information Economy, the War on Terror
and the Evolving Landscape of Information Privacy Law, 5 ISJLP 409, 409-12 (2010)
[hereinafter Hirsch, Information Economy] (describing this process in a number of areas of
law).
10 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1322-23 ("[T]he entire architecture of the Internet is
based on the principle of geographic indeterminacy. .. . Data may be collected in one
location, processed elsewhere, and stored at yet another site.").
11 Cloud computing is "the location of computing resources on the Internet in a fashion
that makes them highly dynamic and scalable." SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5.
12Id. at 8.
13 Id at 5, 10.
14 Id
15 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1316-17; see also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL
DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 19 ("Unlike traditional mass media, the Internet is global.").
16 SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 17 (IT revolution facilitated globalization).
171d at 20 (explaining data transfers based on process optimization, not physical
proximity).
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growth of global business.' 8 Increased economic globalization, in turn, widens
the demand for, and investment in, rapid and inexpensive cross-border data
transfers.19 The upshot is an "exponentially increased .. . flow of personal
information across national borders." 20
The second important change has been the rise in data processing networks.
Previously, most companies employed localized, central databases. Insofar as
they transmitted data across borders, they sent it from one centralized database
to another. 21 These were point-to-point transactions between two discrete
databases. Today, many businesses participate in multi-point data processing
networks. 22 An example would be a multinational company that utilizes a third-
party vendor for its personnel recruitment. 23 Company offices located around
the world send job postings to the vendor.24 Recruitment agencies, individual
applicants, and current employees (making recommendations) located in many
different countries send applications and other personal information to the
vendor, which shares it with the human resources departments at the
multinational firm's various locations. 25 Company human resources
departments may request additional information, leading to another round of
multi-point data transfers.26 This network of data flows involves many different
entities, located in different countries, in a complex stream of data transfers. 27
Such networks, which are increasingly common today, result in a nearly
constant flow of personal information across national borderS28 and have
resulted in "a massive growth in the complexity and volume of these
transfers." 29 Nothing like this was possible prior to the Internet.
The third change is the shift from discrete, one-time data transmissions, to
far more dynamic, ongoing transfers of personal information. In an earlier era, a
company would prepare for an international transfer of personal data and then
implement it at a single, pre-defined point in time.30 These were "static" 31
18 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the
Cloud? A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of Sensitive
Consumer Data, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 418 (2013) (describing the benefit for companies
using Cloud).
19 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1317.20 1d
21 SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 17 ("[D]ata [goes] from one established database to
another."). An example would be a subsidiary that transferred human resources data from its
own local database, to that of its parent company. Id. at 11 (providing such an example).22 See id. at 8.23 1d. at 15.
24 See id
25 Id. at 23.
26 See id. at 15.27 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 15.28 1d at 8.
29Jd
30 1d. at 16.3 1Id. at 5.
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events in the sense that they took place, and then they ended. Currently, cross-
border data transfers take place on demand, continuously, and in real time. 32
They are "dynamic" 33 in the sense that they can occur at any given moment,
have no discrete ending point, and are often difficult if not impossible to predict
in advance.34 An example would be a technology company that has set up
support centers in India, Costa Rica, and Bucharest. When a customer contacts
the company, the firm uses an algorithm based on factors such as time of day
and customer location, to determine which service location should handle the
contact. 35 It then gives that center access to the customer's personal information
and directs the customer to it.36 The result is an international flow of personal
data relating to customer service calls that is context-dependent, "extremely
dynamic and cannot necessarily be predicted in advance." 37
In sum, the rise of the Internet has "exponentially increased" the volume of
international transfers of personal data.38 It has also changed the nature of these
transmissions from transfers that were generally local, point-to-point, and
discrete, into global data flows that are increasingly cross-border, networked,
multi-point, continuous, and dynamic. 39
B. The Conflict Between Global Data Flows and National Data
Protection Laws
Democratic nations broadly agree on the core privacy protections that
should apply in the commercial sphere.40 The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's (OECD) widely endorsed list of Privacy
Principles is the best reflection of this consensus. 41
32 Id ("Modem information systems respond to data requests rapidly and in many
instances in real time."); id. at 8.
33 SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 13.
341d. at 22.
351d. at 14.
36jd
37 1d. at 22.
38 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1317; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 8 ("There
has been a massive growth in the complexity and volume of [international data] transfers.");
Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern Surveillance: An
Analysis ofInnovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071
(2013).
39 Professor Schwartz provides another example that nicely captures this set of
developments. A marketing firm in Spain obtains a list of potential customers from a global
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system in the United States. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 1, at 13. It shares this list with its call center in Mexico, which uses it to execute a
telemarketing campaign in Spain. Id. The Spanish marketing company then shares the results
of its telemarketing effort with the U.S. vendor, which uses it to update the information in its
global CRM system. Id.
40 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1325.
41 See Ben Gerber, The Privacy Principles, OECD PRIVACY, http://oecdprivacy.org/
#principles (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (listing the OECD Privacy Principles).
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The important differences among national systems occur, not with respect
to these broad principles, but in how countries interpret and apply them.42
Examples abound. Some nations define "personally identifiable information"
(PII) more broadly than others.43 Some exclude certain types of personal
information, even if it falls within the definition of PII.44 Countries disagree on
what constitutes adequate notice.45 As a result, "data collectors [may not be able
to] use the same notice for residents of different jurisdictions." 46 Nations differ
on what counts as meaningful choice, and as to when choice must be opt-in and
when it can be opt-out. The European Union requires companies to notify the
data subject of their data collection activities, and the data protection authorities
of their data processing operations.47 The United States does not.48 E.U. nations
have omnibus privacy laws. 49 Others, such as the United States, use sectoral
laws.50 Nations also differ significantly in the execution and enforcement of
their divergent privacy laws. 51 Some provide more oversight and enforcement;
some less.52 Some have active data protection authorities (DPAs); some more
passive DPAs; and some, such as the United States, have no DPA at all.53
These differences are particularly salient on the Internet where personal
data are more likely to travel among a variety of legal jurisdictions and where
these "[i]nternational data flows . . . [force] divergent data protection policies
and rules to confront each other with ever greater frequency." 54 They cause
major difficulties for governments and individuals who wish to protect personal
information as it travels across the globe, and for businesses that depend on the
cross-border transfer of personal data.
42 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1330-3 5.
43 1d. at 1333.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 1338.
461d
47 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free
Movement of Such Data, arts. 10, 11, 18, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter 1995
Directive].
48 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1334 ("U.S. law does not generally impose an
obligation to inform individuals that data about them is being collected.").
49 Id. at 1330.
501d. at 1331.
51Id. at 1330.
521d. at 1334-35.
53 Id. at 1345 ("There is no data protection commission in the United States.").
54 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1318; see also id. at 1336 ("The Internet places
divergent rules in proximity through architectural features that promote geographic
indeterminacy."); Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on
International Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REv. 471, 472, 486-87 (1995) (transferring data
between United States and Europe faces significant challenges).
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1. Problems for Privacy Protection
The differences among national privacy regimes, combined with the
explosion in global data transfers, pose a fundamental challenge for the
protection of individual privacy. At the most basic level, a processor may move
a person's data from a jurisdiction with stringent and well-enforced privacy
laws, to one with lenient and poorly enforced rules.55 Some companies may
purposely operate this way in order to take advantage of "regulatory
arbitrage." 56 Global data flows, combined with national privacy laws, can
accordingly result in the migration of personal data to those nations with the
weakest laws or, at minimum, to temporary gaps in privacy protection as the
data moves through such a jurisdiction.57
Even where each of the relevant nations has implemented meaningful
privacy laws, the cross-border nature of today's data transfers makes it difficult
to track compliance with them. For example, the dynamism and unpredictability
of global data flows make it difficult to tell where personal data is at any given
moment, which entity is responsible for it,5 8 or which jurisdiction's laws
apply.59 This difficulty in establishing clear jurisdiction can, in turn, inhibit
enforcement 60 and make it hard for individuals to seek remedies for
violations. 61 The overall effect is to create "uncertainty and instability of the
protection of individuals['] [privacy]." 62
2. Problems for Business
The lack of consistency among national laws also creates significant
problems for the businesses that engage in cross-border transfers of personal
data and desire to comply with legal requirements. 63 These companies must
55 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1337 (stating that some jurisdictions have far weaker
information privacy rules than others).56 1d. at 1332.
57 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 54 (explaining
differing national privacy laws can lead to "gaps in protection for consumers whose data are
transferred across borders, since it is not always clear who has jurisdiction over data and
what protections exist for foreign consumers").
58 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1323 (stating when multiple entities interact with data
this can "obscure the responsibility for data protection").
59 Id. at 1336 (explaining that multiple nations may assert jurisdiction over a networked
set of data transfers).
60 d. at 1336 n.1 14 (citing Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1199, 1216-21 (1998)).
61 Sunni Yuen, Exporting Trust with Data: Audited Self-regulation as a Solution to
Cross-border Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9
COLUM. SCi. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 44 (2008).
6 2 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1351.
6 3 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
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closely track the flow of their data in order to know which jurisdiction's rules
apply at any given moment. They must understand and monitor compliance
with the privacy laws of each jurisdiction through which their data travels.
Finally, they may need to seek multiple regulatory approvals for routine, cross-
border data transfers.64 These tasks make it far more costly and burdensome to
achieve compliance than it would be if companies were able to follow a single
set of privacy rules throughout their data's lifecycle. 65 As the Department of
Commerce has recognized, companies face "difficulties in complying with the
multiplicity of foreign data protection rules and regulations."66
Differing privacy laws also confront businesses with uncertainty. The
dynamism of global data flows makes it difficult for companies to predict
where, and at what time, they will transfer data across borders and so to comply
with the relevant laws. In addition, conflicts between nations and/or regions
with respect to the adequacy of their respective privacy laws can raise the
prospect of data embargoes. 67 The European Union considers U.S. privacy law
inadequate and may limit data transfers to the United States,68 although the
relevant governments have managed to avoid this so far by means of the Safe
Harbor Agreement and other understandings. 69 Still, the prospect of a data
embargo creates profound uncertainty for businesses that depend on the free
flow of personal data across national borders. 70 Such uncertainty can drive up
the cost of capital, inhibit investment and innovation, and cause tension between
international allies.
The difficulties that consumers face, and those that businesses confront,
reinforce and build on one another. When consumers lose faith in the law's
ability to protect their personal information, this can cause them to pull back
from online businesses. This can, in turn, hurt the companies whose business
models depend on a certain level of consumer trust and participation in the
DIGITAL ECONOMY 31 (2012) ("Differences in national privacy laws create challenges for
companies wishing to transfer personal data across national borders."); see Omer Tene,
Privacy Law's Midhfe Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy
Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1254-57 (2013).
64 THE WHITE HouSE, supra note 63, at 31 ("Complying with different privacy laws is
burdensome for companies that transfer personal data .. .because legal standards may vary
among jurisdictions, and companies may need to obtain multiple regulatory approvals to
conduct even routine operations.").
65 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 14 ("[T]he lack
of cross-border interoperability in privacy principles and regulations creates barriers to
cross-border data flow and significant compliance costs for companies.").66 1d. at 53-54.
6 7 See id.
6 8 See Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1337-38. See generally Bartosz M. Marcinkowski,
Privacy Paradox(es): In Search of a Transatlantic Data Protection Standard, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1167 (2013).
69 See infra Part IV.C.70 See Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1351.
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Internet economy. 71 By the same token, companies that face increased
compliance costs and uncertainties are likely to pass these costs on to
consumers, insofar as they can. This can lead to higher prices for the goods and
services that consumers would like to purchase. The failure to harmonize
national privacy laws can accordingly result in higher prices for consumers. 72
For all of the above reasons, the jumble of inconsistent national and
regional privacy laws conflicts with the contemporary trend towards
increasingly global data flows and poses a challenge to the continued growth
and vibrancy of the Internet and of the global economy. 73 The emergence of a
unified set of privacy rules, on the other hand, would diffuse this threat and
provide benefits to both consumers and industry.74 The Department of
Commerce has called for "a new global framework for privacy protection that
will decrease the cost of doing business globally, provide consumers with
consistent levels of protection worldwide, and contribute to global economic
growth."75 The question is: how to achieve this?
III. REGULATORY OPTIONS
This is a question of regulatory design. It is accordingly important to begin
by consulting regulatory theory with respect to the possible approaches.
Any question of regulatory design requires the designer to answer two basic
questions. First, who will regulate? Second, at what level will that entity
regulate? The first question-who will regulate?-has three possible answers:76
71 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 15 (stating that
the maintenance of "consumer trust is vital to the success of the digital economy");
Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1351 ("The uncertainty and instability of the protection of
individuals will be harmful to international data flows and the wider development of a robust
online community.").
7 2 See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 56.
731d. at 14 ("Improving the global interoperability of data privacy approaches could
enable increased exports of U.S. services and strengthen the American economy."); THE
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 63, at 31 ("[I]t is critical to the continued growth of the digital
economy that [governments] strive to create interoperability between privacy regimes.").
7 4 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 56 ("[M]utual
recognition of substantively similar commercial data privacy laws around the world can
build increased practical protection for consumers and reduce barriers and compliance costs
for business.").
751d. at 57.
7 6 CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN LAW,
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE 51-58 (2011) (distinguishing
between government regulation, self-regulation, and co-regulation); see also HANS-
BREDOW-INSTITUT, FINAL REPORT: STUDY ON CO-REGULATION MEASURES IN THE MEDIA
SECTOR 17 (2006); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-regulation: An
Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL'Y 363, 365-66 (1997); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law
and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-regulation, or Co-regulation?, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 439, 465 (2011) [hereinafter Hirsch, Online Privacy]; BERT-JAAP KOOPS ET AL.,
Should Self-regulation Be the Starting Point?, in STARTING POINT FOR ITC REGULATION:
1038 [Vol. 74:6
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(1) government will regulate industry (direct government regulation), 77 (2)
industry will regulate itself (self-regulation), 78 and (3) government and industry
will intentionally and expressly share responsibility for the drafting and
enforcement of rules ("co-regulation"). 79 The second question-at what level
will that entity regulate?-likewise has three possible answers: (1) regulate at
the level of the individual company (company-based regulation), (2) regulate at
the level of the industry sector (sector-based regulation), or (3) regulate at the
level of the economy as a whole (economy-wide regulation).80 These two
questions, and their respective possible answers, yield nine possible regulatory
design combinations as reflected in the following table.
Table 1: Regulatory Design Options
Direct Government Self-regulation Co-regulation
Regulation
Company 1 4 7
Sector 2 5 8
Economy as a Whole 3 6 9
Governments could use any of these nine options to create international
privacy rules. The remainder of this Section will evaluate which of these
regulatory options is best suited to this task.
DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 109, 119-23 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al.
eds., 2006); Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond
Voluntary Codes, 6 ISJLP 355, 357-58 (2011).
77 MARSDEN, supra note 76, at 54; see also Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366;
Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-regulation, 29 OTTAWA
L. REV. 233, 237-38 (1997-1998).
78 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 365; Priest, supra note 77, at 238 (describing
"entirely voluntary systems of regulation").
79 MARSDEN, supra note 76, at 46; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366;
Rubinstein, supra note 76, at 357. In some sense, most regulation could be said to be co-
regulatory. Government frequently consults industry-either through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or more informally-when it engages in direct regulation. See Gunningham &
Rees, supra note 76, at 366. By the same token, industry often looks to government for input
and feedback when it engages in self-regulation. See MARSDEN, supra note 76, at 63 ("Pure
self-regulation with no prior or later approval amounts to a self-regulatory body that is close
to invisible in practice."). To demarcate co-regulation, it helps to think of a continuum with
pure industry self-regulation on one end (i.e., no government involvement), and pure
government regulation on the other (i.e., no industry role). See Gunningham & Rees, supra
note 76, at 366 (describing a "continuum, with pure forms of self-regulation and government
regulation at opposite ends"). Co-regulation encompasses those initiatives that stand towards
the middle of this continuum-the programs in which government and industry intentionally
and expressly combine their efforts and collaborate on the production, monitoring and
enforcement of rules. See id.
80 See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 155 (2006) (distinguishing between "organizational"
and "sectoral" codes); Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 365.
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A. Direct Government Regulation
In direct regulation, government officials create, monitor compliance with,
and enforce the regulatory requirements.8 ' To establish cross-border privacy
rules through direct regulation, participating countries would first adopt a treaty
or convention establishing international privacy requirements. Each ratifying
nation would then promulgate national laws and regulations that closely tracked
the international template and would enforce these requirements against
companies in their jurisdiction. In such a way, direct, government regulation
would establish uniform, cross-border privacy rules. Professor Joel Reidenberg
has called for an "international treaty on data protection" along these lines.82
The strengths of such an approach would be those commonly associated
with direct regulation. Governments would likely establish relatively uniform,
socially protective sets of rules. The uniformity would make it easier for
regulators to monitor compliance with, and to enforce, these rules.83 It would
also create a level playing field for business.84
Direct regulation, in the form of national laws enforcing an international
treaty, would also face important obstacles and present significant downsides.
The first obstacle is a practical one; it is extremely difficult to establish an
international treaty of any sort.85 This task becomes even harder when the treaty
in question would address an issue, such as privacy, as to which there are deep
cultural and regional differences. 86 It is one thing to set out a broad set of
privacy principles, as the OECD has done, and get a variety of nations to sign
on to them. It is quite another to negotiate a detailed treaty establishing concrete
privacy requirements and convince countries to ratify, implement, and enforce
them. Practical difficulty is one of the major downsides of a direct regulation
approach. It may explain why there have been no serious attempts to create such
a treaty.
Even if it were possible to impose cross-border privacy rules through direct
regulation, regulatory theory suggests that this may not be the optimal approach
for this particular area. Direct government regulation works better in some
81 Priest, supra note 77, at 238; see also MARSDEN, supra note 76, at 54.82 Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1360. Professor Reidenberg suggests following the
model of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and creating a "General
Agreement on Information Privacy (GAIP)." Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 3 See JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 49 (2003).
84 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271
(1985).
8 5 See VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 115 (2001) (explaining that negotiating binding
international agreements is "difficult, defensive, and often leads to inflexible rules").
86 See id. at 82 (discussing difficulty of direct, top-down regulation due to lack of
consensus on the "mechanisms and standards for international privacy protection").
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contexts than in others.87 It can do a good job of regulating slower-moving
areas of the economy that pose significant risks to the public.88 The regulation
of toxic .,pollutants from manufacturing operations would be one such
example.89 However, direct government regulation is not well-suited to areas,
such as privacy regulation, where the technologies and business models change
rapidly and continuously. 90 In these situations, it is difficult for government
officials to know enough about the industries in question to craft intelligent
rules that account for business realities. Moreover, government regulation's
lengthy time frame (e.g., notice-and-comment rulemaking) often fails to keep
pace with fast-moving technological and business changes. 91 Business realities
end up "lapping" the government rules intended to regulate them, rendering
these rules out-of-date or even obsolete.
B. Self-regulation
It is for these reasons that some question the viability of direct government
regulation and consider self-regulation to be the best approach to privacy
governance. 92 Under this approach, industry sets, monitors, and enforces its
own standards. 93 Multinational companies could use self-regulation to set
uniform, cross-border privacy rules. To do so a specific company, or a sector
organization that represents it, could establish a voluntary set of privacy rules.
The company would then commit to following that set of rules throughout its
international operations and so establish a single, global set of privacy rules for
the company.
Proponents of self-regulation argue that, since it comes from industry itself,
it is able to tap into business knowledge and is thereby able to produce more
8 7 See Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Community
Participation: Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
319, 327 (1998).8 8 Id.
8 9 Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can
Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 34 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inner
Environment].
9 0 Gunningham, supra note 87, at 327; Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 89, at 35;
see also HAUFLER, supra note 85, at 115 (concluding that binding international agreements
can lead to "inflexible rules that do not achieve their aims").
91 Hirsch, Inner Environment, supra note 89, at 35; see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONG., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER'S GUIDE 27-28 (1995); Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 31
(2001).
92 HAUFLER, supra note 85, at 92 (discussing those who believe that government should
not seek to regulate information privacy, and should leave the task to industry self-
regulation, because "government regulators" are not capable of dealing with the "rapid
changes and complex issues of the new information economy").
93 Priest, supra note 77, at 256; see Andrew Clearwater & J. Trevor Hughes, In the
Beginning ... An Early History of the Privacy Profession, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 910-12
(2013).
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intelligent and effective rules than government regulation.94 They further argue
that self-regulatory entities, which do not need to comply with notice-and-
comment procedures and other legal requirements, should be able to update
their rules far more quickly than government regulators can.95 Self-regulation
should therefore do a better job of keeping pace with rapidly evolving
technological and business realities. Finally, proponents of self-regulation
maintain that companies, which often resist government-imposed rules, will be
more likely to accept rules that they or their peers have drafted. 96 Self-
regulation will accordingly promote greater industry buy-in and compliance.
Notwithstanding the proponents' arguments, there are both practical and
theoretical reasons to doubt that self-regulation is the best choice for
international privacy rules. To begin with, self-regulation, by definition, does
not involve formal government approval. 97 As a consequence, it neither
provides the legal safe harbor that companies need to engage confidently in
cross-border data transfers, nor absolves firms from the costly duty of having to
track and comply with multiple national privacy laws. It does not truly address
the mismatch between global data flows and national data protection laws and
so will not achieve the practical goals that motivate the search for global
privacy rules in the first place.
Regulatory theory suggests additional reasons to be cautious about self-
regulation. Businesses have an incentive to draft self-regulatory rules that
appear to offer solid protection but are not, in fact, very stringent.98 Self-
regulation accordingly tends to be more lenient than government requirements,
and may not achieve public goals like privacy. 99 Theory further predicts that
companies may commit to impressive-sounding self-regulatory goals but then
fail to subject themselves to the independent monitoring needed to make these
claims credible. 00
9 4 See KOOPS ET AL., supra note 76, at 109 (discussing those who take this position);
see also Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366.
95 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366 (discussing those who take this position);
see also Jared Strauss & Kenneth S. Rogerson, Policies for Online Privacy in the United
States and the European Union, 19 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 173, 181 (2002).
96 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366.
97 Priest, supra note 77, at 238.
98 See BENNETr & RAAB, supra note 80, at 154 (stating that company privacy
commitments tend to be more "public relations" than substance); cf Rhys Jenkins,
Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self Regulation in a Global Economy, UNITED NATIONS INST.
FOR Soc. DEV. PROGRAMME ON TECH. Bus. & Soc'Y, Apr. 2001, at 28, available at
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/%28httpPublications%29/E3B3E78BA
B9A886F80256B5E00344278?OpenDocument (explaining that self-regulation generally
focuses on issues that are damaging to a company's reputation but does not address other
important issues).
99 See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 80, at 134.
100 Jenkins, supra note 98, at 27; KooPS ET AL., supra note 76, at 137; Strauss &
Rogerson, supra note 95, at 183.
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International privacy self-regulation exists at the company and economy-
wide levels. Multinational corporations have established corporate privacy
policies and required each of their units to comply with them.101 This is a form
of cross-border privacy self-regulation at the level of the individual company.
The International Commerce Exchange (ICX) drafted an economy-wide privacy
standard that any company could adopt.102 ICX believed that its standard would
ensure "adequate" protection under the E.U.'s 1995 Data Protection Directive
and so allow companies that followed it to engage in cross-border data
transfers.103
Can international self-regulatory codes provide a harmonized set of rules
that will allow companies to achieve compliance across national borders? There
are reasons to doubt that they can serve this function. To begin with, as
described above, governments do not review or approve self-regulatory
requirements. As a result, companies that follow these rules cannot be sure that
they are in compliance with the laws of the nations among which they transfer
data. Such firms still have to spend resources on learning and meeting many
different sets of national and regional privacy requirements. Compliance with a
self-regulatory standard does not reduce this burden and so provides companies
with little incentive to sign up for and comply with such a standard.
The ICX code of conduct illustrates this. ICX hoped to convince the
European Commission that the code constituted "adequate" protection for the
purposes of the Directive and to have the Commission approve it.104 With such
approval in hand, companies from any economic sector of the economy that
complied with the code would have been able to transfer E.U. citizens' personal
information to any location in the world without running afoul of the adequacy
requirement.105 However, ICX was not able to obtain European approval of its
draft code and so could not guarantee international compliance to companies
that adopted it.106 Few firms committed to follow the ICX code and few today
have even heard of it. This suggests that, without the ability to guarantee legal
compliance, pure self-regulation will neither attract sufficient industry
involvement nor address the need for international privacy standards.
101 See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 80, at 155 (stating multinational corporations
adopt privacy policies); HAUFLER, supra note 85, at 22 (maintaining multinationals adopt
global corporate policies "so that they would not have to deal with such a welter of
conflicting national regulatory systems"); Jenkins, supra note 98, at 23 (declaring
multinational corporations adopt social responsibility policies in order to ensure that their
entire value chain meets standards).
102 International Businesses To Produce a Global Privacy Code, PRIVACY L. & Bus.
INT'LNEWSL., http://worldlii.org/int/journals/PLBIN/2000/3.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
103NICK MANSFIELD, INT'L COMMERCE EXCH., ICX PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
CODE OF CONDUCT (2000) (copy on file with author).
104 Id.
10 5 Id.
10 6 See The ICX Privacy Code of Conduct, ICX, http://www.icx.org.uk/resources/res
0452.htm (last visited June 14, 2013).
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It is harder to know how much weight to give to the theorists' concerns that
self-regulation will result in lenient standards, insufficient monitoring, and lax
enforcement.' 0 7 In the absence of a comprehensive analysis of international
privacy self-regulation one can only look by analogy to domestic examples.
This record is not encouraging. In the United States, consumers find it difficult
to understand and compare company privacy policies and find it impossible to
negotiate the terms of these policies with the companies that post them.108
Sectoral privacy standards have also been less than successful. A study of a
leading self-regulatory program for the behavioral advertising sector found
serious deficiencies in monitoring and enforcement.109 An industry group is
currently seeking to improve on this effort"o and the jury is still out on whether
it will succeed.' 1 ' But the experience thus far does not instill confidence that
self-regulation, much less international self-regulation, will deliver protective
standards and high compliance. As two leading commentators have observed,
"the incentive to breach privacy rules and, in particular, to collect, process, and
disclose personal information without consent will tend to overwhelm the desire
to be privacy-friendly."l12
107See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.108 Tanith L. Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time,
1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 26-27 (2009). See Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto
Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Identity Intermediaries: The "Soft elD" Conundrum,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1392-93 (2013).
109 See Hirsch, Online Privacy, supra note 76, at 459-64 (discussing this research); see
also BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 80, at 171 ("[C]ritics remain skeptical that .. . self-
regulatory rules will be applied forcefully."); Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, The
Network Advertising Initiative: Failing at Consumer Protection and at Self-regulation 2
(presented at the FTC Workshop, Nov. 1-2, 2007), available at http://www.worldprivacy
forum.org/pdf/WPF NAI report Nov2_2007fs.pdf (analysis of Network Advertising
Initiative self-regulatory program).
10 This is the Digital Advertising Alliance's Self-regulatory Program for Online
Advertising. See The Self-regulatory Program for Online Behavioral Advertising, DIGITAL
ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013); see also
Katy Bachman, New Study Says DAA's Privacy Program Falls Short, ADWEEK (Apr. 4,
2012), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/new-study-says-daas-privacy-program-
falls-short- 139400.
1ll Initial studies have found a "significant gap in compliance" with important aspects of
the standard. See SARANGA KOMANDURI, RICHARD SHAY, GREG NORCIE, BLASE UR &
LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. CYLAB, ADCHOICES? COMPLIANCE WITH
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING NOTICE AND CHOICE REQUIREMENTS § 5.1 (2011),
available at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech-reports/CMUCyLab 1 1005.pdf (study
of compliance with DAA AdChoices program). Initial studies have also found that a
significant percentage of consumers do not understand the notice and choice messages
provided to them. See PEDRO GIOVANNI LEON, JUSTIN CRANSHAW, LORRIE FAITH CRANOR,
JIM GRAVES, MANOJ HASTAK, BLASE UR & GuzI Xu, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. CYLAB,
WHAT Do ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING DISCLOSURES COMMUNICATE TO USERS? 1, 2
(2012), available at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech reports/CMUCyLabl2008.
pdf (study of consumer understanding of DAA AdChoices icon).
112 BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 80, at 171.
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Self-regulation, like direct government regulation, may not be the best
vehicle for establishing cross-border privacy rules.
C. Co-regulation
That may explain why policymakers are focusing so heavily on "co-
regulatory" initiatives in which government and industry expressly and
intentionally share responsibility for drafting, monitoring, and enforcing privacy
standards." 3 Proponents of co-regulation argue that it combines the advantages
of self-regulation with those of direct regulation. Like self-regulation, co-
regulatory methods such as enforceable codes of conduct allow industry to draft
the specific privacy rules.114 They therefore draw on industry knowledge and
expertise in much the same way that self-regulation does.115 They are also more
likely to get industry to accept and buy in to rules that they or their peers have
drafted.11 6 Like direct regulation, co-regulatory strategies generally call on
government to establish the privacy framework to which all industry-drafted
rules must conform." 7 They also get regulators involved in assessing,
monitoring compliance with, and enforcing these rules.118 This government
involvement increases the chances that the rules will truly protect the public
ll 3 MARSDEN, supra note 76, at 46; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 76, at 366;
Rubinstein, supra note 76, at 357.
114 Stewart, supra note 91, at 82.
11 NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104 (2002); Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New
System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL.
L. 457, 483, 485 (1996) (stating that a negotiated, sector-based approach can allow
"companies to tailor rules to their own circumstances"); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 22, 27 (1997) (discussing
"collaborative governance" as a form of co-regulation); Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The
Future of Governance, 2009 J. DIsP. RESOL. 411, 418-20.
116GUNNING4AM & SINCLAIR, supra note 115, at 108-09; Freeman, supra note 115, at
12, 23-24. A study of Dutch data protection codes of conduct has shown that some co-
regulatory mechanisms may not be as flexible and adaptable as industry self-regulation. In
the Netherlands, industry sectors draft a code of conduct and submit it to the regulator,
which must approve it. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy
Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 83, 116
[hereinafter Hirsch, Going Dutch]. This generally requires each of the parties to make a
substantial investment in an in-depth negotiation before they can reach agreement on the
terms of the code. See id. at 133-34 & n.339-42. This makes them reluctant to re-open the
terms of the agreement and so leads to static codes of conduct that generally do not change
during their five-year term. See id. at 134-35, 156. In self-regulation, industry sets its own
rules and does not have to obtain government approval of them. Id. at 99 n.97. This makes it
easier for industry to re-open and revise these rules in order to account for changing
technological or business realities.
117 Rubinstein, supra note 76, at 357.
I18 GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 115, at 108-09.
2013] 1045
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
interest, and that companies will comply with them.1 9 In sum, co-regulation
promises rules that are stringent, intelligent, and up-to-date, that government
enforces and industry accepts. This is an attractive picture for an area like
privacy law where technologies and business models change too quickly for
direct regulation, but where the stakes are too high to rely solely on industry
self-regulation.
Co-regulation also has weaknesses. It envisions a government-industry
negotiation over rules. Such regulation through "deal-making" can lead to
sweetheart deals that favor industry interests over those of the public.120 Much
depends on how well the government regulators are able to exercise their
authority (the company needs their approval, after all) and push back against
company desires for less rigorous rules. Public interest stakeholders can counter
industry influence. Including them in the discussion can increase the chances of
a well-balanced set of rules.121 Another weakness is that co-regulation can
sometimes provide certain companies with an advantage over others. Insofar as
the approach allows individual companies to draft their own codes of conduct
and negotiate them with the regulators, this could lead to some companies
having more advantageous arrangements and some less.
Finally, co-regulation may be less nimble and adaptive than self-regulation.
In self-regulation, industry can develop, update, and change its rules all on its
own. It does not need government approval to do so. In co-regulation, industry
and government generally invest significant time and resources to reach
agreement on a set of rules. This often makes them hesitant to reopen
negotiations in order to update the rules. In at least one important example of
privacy co-regulation, the negotiated industry codes of conduct largely
remained unchanged over their five-year initial term.122 Government and
industry negotiators reconvened to update the code only when the expiration of
the code required them to do so. 123
IV. CURRENT INITIATIVES
Policymakers appear to believe that co-regulation's strengths outweigh its
weaknesses. The three leading cross-border privacy rule initiatives all employ
co-regulatory enforceable codes of conduct. These are: Binding Corporate
Rules (BCRs), APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules (CBPRs), and the U.S.-E.U.
Safe Harbor Agreement.
119M.
120Id. at 105 ("[Collaborative negotiations] generate risks of a phenomenon tantamount
to regulatory capture .... .").
121 See infra notes 192, 194-195 and accompanying text (discussing how best to
integrate stakeholders into the negotiation process).
122 Hirsch, Going Dutch, supra note 116, at 134.
123Id. at 134-35.
[Vol. 74:61046
GLOBAL PRIVACY
A. Binding Corporate Rules
Article 25 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive allows companies to
transfer personal data from an E.U. member state to a non-E.U. nation only
where the laws of the non-E.U. nation "ensure[] an adequate level of
protection." 124 This requirement can pose a significant obstacle for
multinational companies that wish to transfer personal data between operations
in the E.U. and those in countries that have not yet passed laws establishing
"adequate" privacy protections.
BCRs provide a way to accomplish such transfers without violating the
Directive. 125 The multinational company creates a legally-binding set of ruleS126
(which can take the form of a code of conduct) that, if followed, provides
"adequate" protections for personal information. It commits that its entire
corporate group--including its operations in non-E.U. nations-will be bound
by and will follow these rules. It then submits these BCRs to a "lead DPA [data
protection authority]" which evaluates whether, in fact, the rules provide
"adequate" protection. 127 In making this assessment, the lead DPA consults
with, and receives comments from, the DPAs of other member states in which
the company operates. 128 If, after receiving these comments, the lead DPA
determines that the corporate rules do, in fact, provide an "adequate" level of
protection, it approves them.129 The company can then transfer personal data
among its various E.U. and non-E.U. operations without violating the Article 25
adequacy requirement so long as it does so in compliance with the approved
rules. This is co-regulation in the sense that the company and the relevant DPAs
work together to negotiate and craft the rules.
BCRs create a legal safe harbor with respect to the Article 25 adequacy
requirement. That is their key function. However, they do not necessarily create
a safe harbor with respect to the data protection laws of specific E.U. member
states, nor do they necessarily do so with respect to the laws of the non-E.U.
nations to which the company transfers the data.130 This limits BCRs' ability to
create global privacy rules. Compliance with a set of approved BCRs ensures
only that the company complies with the Article 25 adequacy requirement when
it transfers personal information outside of the E.U. It does not guarantee that
the corporation is in compliance with the relevant national data protection
laws.131 Thus, a company with an approved BCR must still undertake the costly
124 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 25.12 5 CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
AND REGULATION 219 (2007).
126Id. at 219, 225.
127Id. at 223.
12 81d. at 223-24.
1291d. at 227.
130Id. at 220.
131 European Conun'n, Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Working Document on
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Related to Binding Corporate Rules, at 6, 1271-04-
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task of studying and complying with a variety of different data protection laws;
and regulators, individuals, and others seeking to evaluate that company's
compliance still face the uphill battle of determining which jurisdiction applies
and whether the firm is in compliance with that particular set of laws. BCRs are
further limited in that they are valid only within the corporate group for which
the DPAs have approved them.132 They do not cover transfers from members of
that group to other entities outside the group.133
B. APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules
Companies in the Asia-Pacific region also seek to transfer data across
national borders. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), an
organization of twenty-one Asian and Pacific Rim countries including the
United States, Canada, Japan, China, Russia, Mexico, and Chile, among
others,134 has developed a regulatory initiative to facilitate these transfers. Like
the BCR program, the APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules (CBPR) initiative
relies heavily on co-regulatory codes of conduct. 135
The APEC approach is rooted in a set of Privacy Principles that all APEC
member states have endorsed.136 A participating company prepares a code of
conduct or other set of "cross-border privacy rules" that explains how the APEC
Privacy Principles apply to its specific operations.137 It then submits this code to
an APEC-approved Accountability Agent.'38 The Accountability Agent, which
may be a government body or an independent third party, reviews the code to
ensure that it properly fulfills the APEC Privacy Principles. If the Agent finds
the code to be satisfactory, it approves it.139
02/08/EN, WP 155 rev.04 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wpl55 rev.04_en.pdf; KUNER,supra note 125, at 220.
132 KUNER, supra note 125, at 227.
133 Id.
134See History, APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/History.aspx (last
visited July 15, 2013); Member Economies, APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited July 15, 2013) (listing the current member
countries).
135 See Asia-Pac. Econ. Cooperation, APEC Data Privacy Pathfinder Projects
Implementation Work Plan-Revised, 2009/SOMl/ECSG/SEM/027 (2009), available at
http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Fact-Sheets/APEC-Privacy-Framework.aspx.
136 See generally APEC, APEC Privacy Framework, at 3, APEC#205-SO-01.2 (2005)
[hereinafter APEC Framework], available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-
Trade-and-Investment/-/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05 ecsg privacyframewk.aspx (listing
the APEC Privacy Principles); see also Table 3, infra Part V.B.2, for an overview of these
Principles.
137 Paula J. Bruening, APEC Roundup: Update on Accountability Agents in
Implementation of the APEC Framework, Development of Pathfinder Projects, More, 9
PRIVACY & SECURTTY L. REP. (BNA) 1444 (Oct. 18, 2010).
138 Id
139 Id.
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This approval has an ambiguous legal meaning. It does not provide the
company with a safe harbor with respect to national laws. Even those
companies with approved codes are still subject to the privacy laws of the
individual APEC nations. 140 That said, companies that follow an APEC-
approved code of conduct can feel more comfortable than they otherwise would
that their behavior complies with the laws of APEC member states or that, even
if it turns out that they do not, these countries will not enforce their laws as
harshly as they otherwise would. Thus, APEC privacy codes provide some
comfort to firms that engage in cross-border transfers among APEC states. It
remains to be seen whether this is sufficient incentive to encourage companies
to develop an APEC privacy code and whether such a system truly will
facilitate cross-border data transfers.
C. The U.S.-E. U. Safe Harbor Agreement
The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement, too, uses company codes of
conduct to address a cross-border data transfer issue. The U.S. Department of
Commerce and the European Commission developed the Safe Harbor
Agreement to respond to the 1995 Directive's "adequacy" requirement which,
once U.S. laws were deemed to be "inadequate," promised to disrupt vital data
transfers between the two trading partners.141 The Safe Harbor Agreement seeks
to address this problem and facilitate cross-border data flows between the E.U.
and the United States.142
The Agreement defines a set of principles-the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles-that both E.U. and U.S. officials agree approximate the
requirements of E.U. data protection law.143 Under the Agreement, a company
can develop its own set of privacy and data governance practices-essentially, a
code of conduct-that translates the Safe Harbor Principles and explains how
the company will comply with them. Alternatively, it can join a safe harbor
14 0 APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules System: Policies, Rules and Guidelines, APEC,
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/-/media/Files/Groups/EC
SG/CBPR/CBPR-PoliciesRulesGuidelines.ashx (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) ("The CBPR
System does not displace or change an Economy's domestic laws and regulations....
Participation in the CBPR System does not replace a participating organization's domestic
legal obligations. . . . Where domestic legal requirements exceed what is expected in the
CBPR System, the full extent of such domestic law and regulation will continue to apply.");
accord Justin Brookman, Can "Cross-border Privacy Rules" Trump Divergent Data
Protection Laws?, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 4, 2011),
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/justin-brookman/410can-"cross-border-privacy-rules"-trump-
divergent-data-protection-laws (explaining the APEC framework explicitly requires
compliance with various national data protection laws).
141 Rubinstein, supra note 76, at 390-91.142 See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/
eu/egmain_ 018476.asp (last updated July 1, 2013, 8:51 AM).
143 See Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21,
2000), http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/egmain_018475.asp.
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"self-regulatory privacy program," such as TRUSTe's E.U. Safe Harbor Seal
Program, that guides companies on how to comply with the Safe Harbor
Principles.144 Individual companies self-certify to the Department of Commerce
and in their own posted privacy policy that they are in compliance with the Safe
Harbor Principles.145 So long as they meet this commitment, companies are
deemed to provide "adequate" protection for the purposes of the 1995 Directive
and can transfer personal data to and from the E.U. Firms that fail to follow
through are subject to FTC enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act for
engaging in a "deceptive" business practice.146 Companies that fail to sign up
for the Safe Harbor program altogether are deemed not to provide "adequate"
protection and are, in theory, prohibited from processing the personal data of
E.U. citizens.
The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement is similar in many ways to BCRs
and APEC CBPRs. Each requires a government official or representative to
approve an industry-drafted code of privacy practices. Each provides some
degree of legal protection to firms that comply with such a code. One salient
difference is that, while the BCR and APEC CBPR initiatives currently work
only at the level of the individual company, the Safe Harbor program also
recognizes self-regulatory privacy programs (e.g. TRUSTe) that operate at the
economy-wide level. Many different companies, from a variety of economic
sectors, may "join" such an organization and follow its guidelines on
compliance with the Safe Harbor Principles. Thus, while the BCR and CBPR
initiatives constitute co-regulation at the company level, the U.S.-E.U. Safe
Harbor Agreement includes both company level and economy-wide co-
regulation.
D. The Current Initiatives Share a Common Weakness
The current initiatives-BCRs, CBPRs, and the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor
Agreement-share some common virtues. They provide companies (and, in the
case of the Safe Harbor Agreement, self-regulatory privacy programs such as
TRUSTe) with a means to create an approved, cross-border set of privacy rules.
And they do this through a co-regulatory mechanism that utilizes industry
knowledge to produce intelligent rules. Each works only with respect to certain
borders (for BCRs, the borders of the E.U.; for CBPRs, those of APEC member
nations; and for the Safe Harbor Agreement, those between the E.U. and the
United States), and so none provides a truly global solution. Still, each takes an
important step toward the goal of broadly applicable, cross-border privacy rules.
The three initiatives also suffer from the same fundamental weakness: They
rely on individual companies, rather than industry sectors, to draft the cross-
144 Id.; see also Datasheets, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/resources/#/Datasheets
(last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (describing TRUSTe's role).
145 Rubinstein, supra note 76, at 391.
146 Id.; Dep't of Commerce, supra note 143.
1050 [Vol. 74:6
GLOBAL PRIVACY
border privacy rules.147 That is, they are company-based codes rather than
sector-based ones. This has a number of important drawbacks that those who
promote and write about cross-border privacy rules do not as yet appear to have
grappled with.
To begin with, it is expensive to write a comprehensive privacy code and
negotiate it with the relevant authority. Only the largest and most sophisticated
companies have the resources and expertise to do this.148 Small- and medium-
sized businesses, and even some large companies, will not be able to develop
their own company-specific code of conduct that meets the requirements of the
1995 Data Protection Directive, APEC Privacy Principles, or U.S.-E.U. Safe
Harbor Agreement. 149 As a consequence, only the largest and most
knowledgeable companies will be able to take advantage of BCRs, CBPRs, and
the Safe Harbor Program (unless they participate in a Safe Harbor self-
regulatory privacy program, the drawbacks of which are detailed below).150 The
roster of companies that have successfully negotiated the BCR process bears
this out. The list of forty-six companies includes such firms as Accenture,
American Express, British Petroleum, Citigroup, eBay, General Electric, ING
Bank, and Shell International.151 What about all the other, smaller companies
that transfer personal data between and among E.U. member states but cannot
afford to draft and negotiate a BCR? They are left without a streamlined
mechanism for compliance with E.U. "adequacy" requirements. The same can
be said for the APEC CBPRs and for the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement
insofar as it uses company codes of conduct.152
Were more firms to become able to take advantage of "company-based"
codes (so named because they are drafted and negotiated at the level of the
individual company or firm), this would create another large problem-high
administrative costs for regulators.153 DPAs (in the case of BCRs) and
government agencies serving as APEC Accountability Agents would have to
147 The Safe Harbor Agreement also employs economy-wide sets of privacy rules, i.e.,
those developed by safe harbor organizations and open to companies from any economic
sector. These are also flawed, as explained infra.
148 KUNER, supra note 125, at 220 ("[T]he [BCR] approval process can be lengthy, and
implementation can be expensive and difficult for all but large multinationals.").
149 Cf Priest, supra note 77, at 258 (asserting small companies find it burdensome to
engage in self-regulation).
150 See infra.
151 See the listing of those companies that have completed the BCR process that is
available at List of Companies for Which the EU BCR Cooperation Procedure Is Closed,
EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/intemational-
transfers/binding-corporate-rules/bcr_cooperation/index en.htm (last updated Aug. 26,
2013).
152 Cf Priest, supra note 77, at 281 (concluding company-based approaches to self-
regulation lead to disparate obligations for different firms).
153 Id. at 258 (stating firm-based self-regulation makes it "more costly" for government
regulators); id at 278 (explaining individuated, company-based self-regulatory regime
compromises efficiency).
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review, negotiate, and approve an individual code for every company that
wanted to engage in an international data transfer. This would present a
significant, possibly insurmountable, burden for these resource-strapped public
bodies. The APEC CBPR program seeks to minimize this by anointing
independent "Accountability Agents" to review and approve the codes. But this
has a downside of its own in that, insofar as Accountability Agents are private
rather than public entities, they may not sufficiently protect the public interest.
Company-based codes also suffer from another problem: they frustrate
public participation and so reduce accountability. Privacy NGOs have even
fewer resources than regulatory agencies. If a significant number of companies
were to submit codes for the BCR or CBPR programs or self-certify compliance
with a code under the Safe Harbor program, stakeholders would lack the
resources to keep track of, much less participate in, the many submissions,
negotiations, and approvals.1 54 Company-specific codes will escape public
scrutiny by overwhelming it with sheer numbers.
Of course, it may turn out that only a small number of companies have the
resources and sophistication to establish firm-based, cross-border rules. If so,
then regulators and stakeholders may be able to manage supervision of these
codes. But the small number of participating companies will exacerbate the first
problem identified-the uneven playing field between those large companies
that are able to draft and negotiate their own set of cross-border privacy rules,
and the small- and medium-sized enterprises that lack the resources and
expertise to do so. This will hurt the very start-up and emerging companies on
which the information economy depends for innovation.
Before leaving this topic, it is important to note that while companies can
develop their own code that meets the Safe Harbor Principles, self-regulatory
privacy programs also exist to educate such companies on the Principles and
guide them through the self-certification process.155 This could allow many
companies to come together under the banner of a single safe harbor
organization, such as TRUSTe, and so reduce the resource and administrative
burdens associated with code drafting and approval. This "economy-wide"
approach to cross-border codes (so named because safe harbor organizations,
eager for members, are generally open to companies from any sector of the
economy) mitigates one set of problems but replaces it with another. As
regulatory theorists have explained, the principal virtue of industry-drafted
codes of conduct is that they are able to tap into private sector knowledge and
produce rules that are tailored to the realities of the business world.156 When a
company or trade association that represents a particular sector drafts a code, it
generally achieves this benefit. Companies and sectors have particular realities
that characterize them, and the drafters can tailor a code to address them. By
154 Stakeholders typically have even fewer resources to devote to this task than
government agencies do.
155 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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contrast, when a safe harbor organization or other such entity offers an
economy-wide approach open to companies from many different sectors, it is
not able to tailor it to particular realities. Such interpretations of the Safe Harbor
Principles must, necessarily, remain broad enough to encompass firms from
many different lines of business that have divergent characteristics. They will
therefore fail to take advantage of the principal attribute of codes of conduct and
the main reason why policymakers look to them-the ability to draw on firms'
knowledge of their own particular realities and tailor the rules to account for
them.
V. SECTOR-BASED PRIVACY CODES: A BETTER SOLUTION
There is another way to structure cross-border, co-regulatory codes of
conduct. Industry sectors could draft them. They could then submit these
sectoral codes to the relevant national and regional governments for approval.
Once these governments approved the code, individual firms that complied with
it would be in compliance with the laws of each of the approving jurisdictions.
The sectoral code would serve as an international set of privacy rules for
companies within its sector.
Employing sector-based-as opposed to company-based or economy-
wide-codes of conduct would ameliorate many of the problems that the other
two approaches produce. Sector-based codes would be accessible, not only to
the largest and most sophisticated firms, but to small- and medium-sized ones as
well. Such smaller companies could organize themselves-either through a
trade association or otherwise-and pool their resources to support the drafting
and negotiation of a code of conduct for their sector. This would make
participation in a sector-based code system feasible for such companies in a
way that developing a company-based code would not be. More companies
would accordingly have access to sector-based codes than to company-based
ones.
A sector-based system would also reduce regulators' administrative costs.
There are fewer sectors than there are companies. Concentrating the code
negotiation process at the level of the sector would therefore reduce the
resources needed to supervise and engage in this process. Sector-based codes
should also be more amenable to public participation than their company-based
counterparts. Stakeholder organizations will have a smaller number of codes to
review and monitor. These groups should find this to be a much more
manageable task. For all of the above reasons, sector-based codes would likely
function better than the company-based codes on which the current initiatives
rely so heavily.
They also stack up well against the economy-wide approach that the Safe
Harbor program utilizes. Economy-wide interpretations of the Safe Harbor
Principles must speak in broad terms so that many different types of companies
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can utilize them. 157 They cannot tailor themselves to the specific realities of a
company or sector. Sector-based codes, on the other hand, can do this. The
drafters of a sector-based code-for example, a trade association that represents
that sector-can draw on the experience and knowledge of companies in that
branch of industry. They can build this into the code and so produce a document
that intelligently accounts for the specific technological and business realities of
that particular sector. 158 Sector-based codes will possess the most important
advantages of company-based and economy-wide codes while avoiding their
most significant weaknesses. Initiatives seeking to establish cross-border
privacy rules should employ sector-based codes in place of, or in addition to,
these other two types of codes. The following table depicts the current
initiatives and where the recommended sector-based approach would fit among
them.
Table 2: Cross-border Privacy Rules
Direct Regulation Self-regulation Co-regulation
Company-Based International treaty BCRs
implemented Corporate privacy policies CBPRs
through national law Safe Harbor
Sector-Based (Network Advertising Proposed
International treaty Intaie 59 prohInitiative)159 approach
Economy as a
W oe aInternational treaty ICX Code Safe Harbor
Whole
A. Achieving International Privacy Rules Through Sector-Based Codes:
An Implementation Strategy
There is precedent for using sector-based codes of conduct in privacy law.
Dutch data protection regulation relies heavily on them. The Netherlands has a
national privacy law, the Personal Data Protection Act.160 However, the Dutch
DPA does not promulgate regulations to implement the Act. Instead it invites
15 7 See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
158 BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 80, at 156 ("Sectoral codes permit ... a more refined
set of rules tailored to the issues within each industry.").
159 The Network Advertising Initiative is a group of more than ninety online advertising
companies that has adopted a code of conduct for protecting consumer privacy in interest-
based advertising. See NAI: NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadver
tising.org/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (describing the NAI and providing a link to the 2013
NAI code of conduct). The purpose of this sector-based self-regulatory organization is to
encourage best practices among industry members and so, perhaps, to obviate the need for
direct government regulation of behavioral advertisers. NAI thus has a domestic rather than
an international focus. Still, it can serve as an example of a self-regulatory, sector-based
code.
16 0 Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens, Stb. 2000, p. 302, ch. 3, art. 25 (Neth.).
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industry sectors, usually represented by a trade association, to draft codes of
conduct that apply the Act to the realities of their specific sector. 161 Once the
Dutch DPA approves a given code, any company in that sector that complies
with it inhabits a legal safe harbor with respect to the statute. 162 The Dutch DPA
has approved twenty sector-based codes of conduct including codes drafted by
the pharmaceutical, banking, insurance, direct marketing, and credit rating
industries.1 63 These codes are tailored to the business realities of the specific
sectors that they govern. 164
The Dutch program can serve as a model for the establishment of cross-
border, sectoral privacy rules. Such an international initiative would work as
follows. First, an industry sector would draft a code of conduct that complies
with the E.U.'s 1995 Data Protection Directive and with the APEC Privacy
Principles, and that tailors these requirements to its particular realities. Next, the
sector would submit the code to European authorities who would review it for
compliance with the 1995 Directive. If these officials approved it, then
individual companies that followed the terms of the code would be deemed to
be in compliance with the data protection laws of all twenty-eight E.U. member
states. The code would constitute a legal safe harbor with respect to all E.U.
member states and would represent "adequate" protection for data transferred
outside the E.U.
The sector would then take the same code and submit it to an APEC
Accountability Agent who would review it for compliance with the APEC
Privacy Principles. If the Agent approved the code, then it would constitute a
legal safe harbor (or something close to it) with respect to the twenty-one APEC
member economies, including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.
Once this happened, companies that followed the twice-approved code could
transfer data across borders with confidence that they were complying with the
laws of the most significant European and Asian-Pacific nations. The code
would constitute a nearly global set of cross-border privacy rules.165
Is such an approach realistic? To assess this it is important, first, to examine
the E.U. and APEC systems on the level of process. Does each system have
procedures in place that would allow it to approve a sector-based code? If so,
would this act truly create a legal safe harbor for companies that followed the
161 See Hirsch, Going Dutch, supra note 116, at 116 (describing this feature of the Dutch
data protection code of conduct program).
162 Id at 122 ("They (the Dutch) implement, and create a safe harbor with respect to, all
statutory requirements.").163Id at 89 & n.27, 162-66 (providing Appendix that identifies all twenty approved
Dutch codes).
164Id. at 103 n.121, 157-58 (providing examples of such tailoring).165 1t would leave out parts of South America and Africa for which there is not yet a
regional organization that could approve such a code. This is an important omission insofar
as it could increase the costs of doing business in these areas as compared to those in which
regional authorities had approved the code. One solution would be for South America and
Africa to develop regional privacy organizations similar to APEC that could adopt privacy
principles and approve codes consistent with these principles.
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approved code? Next, it is important to examine the E.U. and APEC systems
with respect to substance. Are these systems' privacy requirements sufficiently
congruent that a single code could integrate them into a single set of rules? Or
do they conflict with one another such that it is not possible to combine them in
this way? The remainder of this section will analyze the proposed strategy on
the levels of both process and substance.
B. Global Codes: Process
Do the E.U. and APEC systems have a process for approving sector-based
codes of conduct?
1. E. U. Approval
In seeking to answer this question with respect to the E.U. system, it is
important to look both at E.U. law as it exists today (i.e., the 1995 Data
Protection Directive) and as it is likely to be in a few years' time (i.e., the
proposed General Data Protection Regulation). Under either scenario, E.U. law
should offer a clear mechanism for evaluating and approving sector-based codes
that, if approved, will constitute a legal safe harbor with respect to all E.U.
member nations.
a. The 1995 Data Protection Directive
Article 27 of the 1995 Directive expressly authorizes "trade associations"
representing a branch of industry to draft a code of conduct and submit it to the
Article 29 Working Party.166 The Working Party "shall determine ... whether
the drafts submitted to it are in accordance with the national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive." 67 If they are, the Directive instructs the Working
Party to "approve[]" the code and the European Commission to publicize this
approval. 168 Such an approved, E.U.-wide code is known as a "Community
Code."' 69 A Community Code differs from a BCR in that it constitutes a legal
safe harbor with respect to the laws of all twenty-eight E.U. member states,
whereas BCRs ensure compliance only with the Article 25 "adequacy"
requirement. It also differs in that a Community Code is proposed by and
applicable to an industry sector, whereas a BCR is proposed by and applicable
to an individual company. Given that a Community Code represents compliance
with the data protection laws of all E.U. member states, a multinational
company that followed a Community Code throughout its operations should
166 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 27(2)-(3).
167M art. 27(3).
1689
169 Id
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also meet the Article 25 "adequacy" test. So long as all of its corporate groups
complied with the Code, it should be able to freely transfer data outside the E.U.
The Federation of European Direct and Interactive Marketing's (FEDMA)
Community Code provides an example of how this process would work.
FEDMA drafted and proposed a Community Code. 170 In 2003, the Article 29
Working Group approved it. 171 The code incorporates the requirements of the
1995 Directive and tailors them to the particular realities of the direct marketing
industry.172 It provides a legal safe harbor, valid with respect to the data
protection laws of all twenty-eight E.U. member states, for any European direct
marketing firm that complies with it. In 2010, the Article 29 Working Party
approved an "annex" to the FEDMA code that covers online marketing. 173
It is worth noting that the direct marketing industry is the only sector that
has successfully established a Community Code. This underutilization of the
Article 27 Community Code process is likely a reflection of the significant costs
involved in drafting and negotiating a code of this type. Still, the Article 27
process, as illustrated by the Article 29 Working Party's approval of the
FEDMA code, appears to provide just the process needed to establish sector-
based, international privacy rules that would function throughout the E.U. In
theory, any sector could propose such a code to the Article 29 Working Party. If
the Working Party approved it, the code would provide a legal safe harbor with
respect to the data protection laws of all E.U. member states. Thus, at least with
respect to the European Union, a clear process exists for implementing E.U.-
wide, sector-based privacy codes.
b. The Proposed General Data Protection Regulation
European data protection law is in flux. On January 25, 2012, the European
Commission proposed a new General Data Protection Regulation that, if
adopted, would replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive. 174 The proposed
General Regulation would be directly binding on regulated parties in the E.U.
and so would harmonize data protection law throughout the European Union.
170 See European Comm'n, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 3/2003
on the European Code of Conduct of FEDMA for the Use of Personal Data in Direct
Marketing, at 3, 10066/03/EN final, WP 77 (June 13, 2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp77 en.pdf.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 3-4.
173 See European Comm'n, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2010
on the European Code of Conduct of FEDMA for the Use of Personal Data in Direct
Marketing, at 2-3, 00065/2010/EN, WP 174 (July 13, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recomnendation/files/2010/wpl74 en.pdf.
174 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed General Regulation].
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This new set of laws, or some version of it, is likely to replace the 1995
Directive within the next few years.
Like the 1995 Directive, the proposed General Regulation provides a means
for developing E.U.-wide, sector-based codes of conduct. Article 38 of the
proposed Regulation (January 25, 2012 draft) requires national supervisory
authorities and the European Commission to "encourage the drawing up of
codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper application of this
Regulation, taking account of the specific features of the various data
processing sectors."1 75 Where the association proposing the code represents
data controllers in a number of different member states (as would be the case in
the strategy that this Article proposes), the proposed Regulation allows the
organization to "submit draft codes of conduct ... to the Commission."l 76 It
gives the Commission (i.e., the European Commission) the authority to "adopt
implementing acts for deciding that the codes of conduct ... submitted to
it ... have general validity within the Union."' 77
This proposed procedure appears in many respects similar to the one that
Article 27 of the 1995 Directive currently makes available. It allows trade
associations to submit sector-based codes of conduct to the Commission. It
authorizes the Commission to approve such codes and so to give them "general
validity" throughout the European Union. The only meaningful difference is
that, under the 1995 Directive, the Article 29 Working Party reviews and
approves the code whereas, under the proposed General Regulation, the
Commission handles this task. But other than that, the proposed Regulation, in
its current form at least, keeps in place the process now available under
Article 27 of the 1995 Directive for the approval of Community Codes. In
conclusion, both existing and proposed E.U. data protection laws appear to
provide exactly the process needed to establish legally approved, E.U.-wide,
sector-based codes of conduct.
2. APEC Approval
It is far less clear whether the APEC Privacy Framework, as currently
constituted, would support the approval of sector-based codes. The APEC
CBPR program allows individual companies to submit codes of conduct to an
Accountability Agent and to seek the Agent's approval that the code complies
with the APEC Privacy Principles. But nothing in APEC's published procedures
suggests that an industry sector could submit such a code and obtain approval of
it. If sectors are to be able to utilize the E.U. and APEC processes to establish
international privacy rules, it will be important for APEC expressly to open its
process to sector-based codes. Absent such a change, large, sophisticated
17 5 Id. art. 38(1).
176Id. art. 38(3).
17 7 Id. art. 38(4).
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companies will be able to take advantage of the APEC cross-border rules
process but many small- and medium-sized enterprises will not.
The APEC process also falls short in its creation of a legal safe harbor. As
explained above, APEC guidance makes clear that an Accountability Agent's
approval of a company code does not guarantee compliance with the data
protection laws of APEC member nations and does not create a legal safe
harbor with respect to them.178 This means that firms operating in the APEC
framework will still have to track and comply with the data protection laws of
many different nations; and regulators, individuals, or other stakeholders trying
to check on compliance will find it hard to know which jurisdiction's rules
apply at any given momernLin personal data's cross-border journey. Thus, the
APEC CBPR system will not fully address the problems that cross-border data
transfers create for business, data subjects, or other stakeholders. This contrasts
with the Article 29 Working Party's approval of a Community Code (or the
Commission's approval of a sector-based code under the proposed Regulation),
which clearly does create a legal safe harbor-and so a single set of rules-with
respect to the entire E.U.
The APEC system needs to change in two ways in order to allow for the
implementation of sector-based, cross-border codes. It needs to open up its code
approval process to industry sectors. And it needs to increase the legal
significance of Accountability Agent approval so that it more closely
approximates a legal safe harbor. This will facilitate cross-border data transfers
among the APEC nations. It will also enable the APEC and E.U. code approval
systems to operate in concert with one another and so to produce cross-border
privacy rules that encompass the E.U., the United States, and much of Asia.
C. Global Codes: Substance
This raises the second major question: can these two systems work in
harmony? Is there sufficient substantive overlap? This is a tricky question
because the law in this area is a moving target. The APEC Privacy Principles
appear to be stable for now. But European data protection law is not. As was
mentioned above, the European Commission has proposed a General Data
Protection Regulation that would replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive. 179
The proposed Regulation would directly bind regulated parties in the E.U. and
would not require member states to implement legislation. In this way, it would
further harmonize E.U. data protection law. The General Data Protection
Regulation will likely replace the 1995 Directive within the next few years.
U.S. privacy law is also in flux. To date, U.S. privacy law has consisted of
targeted statutes that regulate specific sectors (e.g., health care, financial
institutions). In recent years, members of the House and the Senate have
proposed comprehensive commercial privacy legislation that would expand
178 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.179 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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U.S. privacy to all other economic sectors.180 The Commercial Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2011, a bipartisan bill introduced by Senator John McCain (R-
Ariz.) and then-Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), is the most developed of these
legislative proposals and illustrates this legislative direction.' 8 ' The Bill would
establish a broad set of privacy requirements-the commercial privacy "Bill of
Rights." 82 It would then allow sector-based trade associations (as well as other
private entities) to develop a code that fleshes out the statute and applies it to
their sector.183 If the FTC were to agree that the code properly interprets the
statute, and approve it, then the Bill would grant those firms that comply with
the code a legal safe harbor analogous to the one that the E.U. provides for
companies that follow an approved Community Code. 184 This is a far stronger
safe harbor than the one that would otherwise be available to U.S. companies
under the APEC CBPR system. While Congress is unlikely to pass
comprehensive privacy legislation in the near future, another major controversy
regarding commercial holdings of personal data, coming on top of the recent
scandal involving National Security Agency access to private-sector phone and
Internet records, could cause it to act.
This evolving picture complicates the analysis of whether comprehensive
E.U., APEC, and (potentially) U.S. privacy laws overlap sufficiently for a cross-
border code to incorporate the requirements of each. It requires that the analysis
consider four bodies of privacy law: the 1995 Directive, the proposed General
Data Protection Regulation, the APEC Privacy Principles, and the Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act (the congressional bill that has received the most
attention and that best represents how U.S. privacy law may evolve in the
future).
Table 3 depicts the substantive contours of the four existing and proposed
sets of comprehensive privacy rules. The first column identifies the main types
of privacy-protective requirements that such systems might include. Each of the
subsequent columns is devoted to one set of privacy rules (the 1995 Directive,
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, the APEC Privacy Principles,
or the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act) and indicates whether that set of
rules contains the listed privacy requirements. This allows one to see the extent
to which these systems overlap with one another. Table 3 is reproduced in the
Appendix with supporting citations, but for purposes of clarity it appears
immediately below without footnotes.
180 See Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 1528, 112th Cong. § 9 (2011);
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); BEST
PRACTICES Act of 2011, H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011).
181 See S. 799.
182 See id. § § 101-303.
183 See id. § 501.
18 4 See id. §§ 501-02.
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Table 3: Substantive Overlap 85
1061
E.C. 1995 E.U. General APEC Privacy U.S. Commercial Privacy
Requirements Directive Regulation Principles Bill of Rights Act
Transparency of Data
Practices
Choice/Consent / / / /
Legitimate Bases
(Other than Consent)
Security Safeguards / / /
Accuracy / / / /
Access / / / /
Correction / / / /
Purpose Limit on Use / / /
Sensitive Data / / (V) /
Accountability / / /
Purpose Limit on
Collection
Data Minimization / / /
Fair and Lawful / / /
Retention and Disposal / / /
Privacy by Design / /
Prior Check / /
Right To Object / /
Automated Decisions / /
Notification to Data
Subject
Children's Data
Requires Parent's / )
Consent
Data Protection by
Default
Privacy Impact
Assessment
Notification to Data
Protection Authority
Documentation of
Processing
Right To Be Forgotten
and to Erasure
Data Portability /
Preventing Harm / /
Data Protection
Officer
Supervisory Authority / V
"Adequacy" Limit for
International Transfer
185 Table 3 is reproduced with supporting citations in the Appendix.
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Table 3 shows that the four comprehensive systems of privacy rules do
overlap in many of the most important areas. 186 Each system provides for (1)
transparency with respect to data practices, (2) choice/consent, (3) legitimate
bases for processing other than consent, (4) reasonable security safeguards, (5)
accuracy, (6) access, (7) correction, (8) purpose limitations with respect to the
use of personal data, (9) purpose limits with respect to the collection of personal
data, and (10) special protections for sensitive data. In addition, three out of the
four systems provide for (11) accountability, (12) data minimization, (13) fair
and lawful processing, and (14) limits on retention and disposal of personal
data. While Table 3 also shows that these systems differ in a number of ways,
fourteen significant areas of overlap is a lot of common ground. Potentially, a
sector could develop a code that addressed each of these requirements in a way
acceptable to each of the relevant systems. Firms that complied with such a
code would know that they met the most significant privacy requirements of
each system.
In order to build in all the requirements of each system, such a code would
need to go beyond the areas of overlap and include elements (e.g., data
portability or the prevention of harm) that are currently present in only one or
two of the systems. To be truly universal, such a comprehensive code would
have to incorporate the most stringent requirements from each set of privacy
rules. This would lead to a "ratcheting up" of requirements for companies that
otherwise would only be subject to one such system or another. The increased
efficiency to be gained from a single, nearly global set of privacy rules, as well
as any enhanced consumer trust that their commitment to follow a stringent
code may bring them, could provide firms with sufficient incentive to take such
a step. The production and implementation of (nearly) global privacy codes
could accordingly lead to an increase in privacy protections.
It is also important to qualify any conclusions drawn from Table 3 and to
recognize what it cannot tell us. Table 3 lists only broad privacy requirements.
It says nothing about how each system defines and interprets these
requirements. For example, two systems may each require "consent" to the
processing of personal data, thereby making it appear that they are similar. But
further examination may show that one system allows opt-out consent across
the board, while the other requires opt-in consent in certain situations.187 A
drafter seeking to put together a cross-border code would, accordingly, have to
examine in detail the definitions, explanatory statements, and regulatory and
applicable judicial interpretations in order to compose a requirement that would
186 This should not be surprising given that these sets of laws share a common root: the
eight basic principles of privacy protection as set forth in the Fair Information Privacy
Practices that the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and later the
OECD, articulated. See Gerber, supra note 41 (setting forth the eight basic privacy principles
as collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security
safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability).
187 Cf Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 1332-35 (describing instances in which jurisdictions
subscribe to the same privacy principles but interpret them quite differently).
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truly satisfy each of the relevant systems. While such an analysis is clearly
needed in order to determine whether the various privacy rule systems can
actually be combined into a single code, it is beyond the scope of this Article
and will require additional research. Table 3 seeks only to provide a "first cut"
at the analysis by determining whether the broad frameworks match up. It
shows that, with respect to many important privacy requirements, they do. On
the levels of both process and substance, the conditions are sufficiently
favorable to warrant further exploration of this approach.
D. Multi-stakeholder Codes of Conduct: The White House Approach
In its 2012 report, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World, the
White House expressed its enthusiasm for enforceable privacy codes of
conduct.' 88 It called for legislation that would establish a Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights,189 allow private groups to implement them through a code of
conduct,190 and create a legal safe harbor where FTC approves such codes.191
The White House expressed its intention to include "international stakeholders"
in the discussions about particular codes of conduct so that the codes could
come to reflect a "transatlantic consensus on important, emerging privacy
issues."192 It disclosed "plans to develop additional mechanisms-such as
jointly developed codes of conduct-that support mutual recognition of legal
regimes."l 93
On one level, these White House pronouncements parallel and reinforce
some of this Article's key positions. The report envisions group-based codes-
perhaps even sector-based codes-rather than individual company codes. It
envisions using codes of conduct to "support mutual recognition of legal
regimes." While this latter statement may be somewhat vague and undeveloped,
it nonetheless shows an interest in using codes in this way. The White House
report supports additional exploration of this approach to cross-border privacy
rules.
The White House report also goes beyond this Article's analysis in ways
that raise interesting questions about how best to implement the code
negotiation process. The report calls for "multi-stakeholder" groups to develop
the codes, and states that such groups will consist of "individual companies,
industry groups, privacy advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics,
international partners, State Attorney Generals, Federal civil and criminal law
enforcement representatives, and other relevant groups." 94 These groups must
188 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 63, at 23-29.
I89 Id at i.
190Id at 23.
191Id at 37.
192Id. at 33.
193 Id
194 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 63, at 23.
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reach "consensus" on the code before companies can adopt it.195 Clearly,
stakeholders must be involved in the code negotiation process. But is such a
large group workable? This is a far greater array of parties than negotiate the
Dutch codes or the APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules. 196 The size and
complexity of such groups raise questions about transaction costs and the ability
to reach consensus on broad and meaningful requirements. Pursuant to the
White House agenda, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) has for the past year been facilitating a multi-
stakeholder process of this type to develop a code of conduct on Mobile App
Transparency. 197 The process, which began with over 200 representatives
present at the initial negotiation, has made important progress. However, it
remains to be seen whether it can produce a meaningful code with a substantial
number of adoptees.
Another difference is the White House's intention to proceed with multi-
stakeholder codes of conduct even in the absence of comprehensive privacy
legislation.198 Under such a scenario, neither the FTC nor any other agency will
independently assess and approve the code. Instead, the report envisions that the
government's role be limited to "help[ing] the parties reach clarity," and that it
not get involved in "substituting its own judgment" for that of the multi-
stakeholder group.199 This precludes the use of mutually approved codes of
conduct that could create a cross-border legal safe harbor for firms that
followed a code. It also means that the codes will not create a legal safe
harbor-one of the key attractions for industry. Will such a code be able to
attract a sufficient number of industry participants? Again, the NTIA's current
experiment with the multi-stakeholder negotiation over Mobile App
Transparency appears to be a valuable one that could provide important lessons
about this regulatory approach.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Part II of this Article showed that a world of increasingly global data flows
needs cross-border privacy rules to foster the Internet economy and protect
individual privacy. Part III began by posing two questions about how to design
such a system: (1) who should regulate? and (2) at what level should they
regulate? It is now possible to answer these questions. Who should regulate?
Government and industry should regulate together. Co-regulation is likely to be
195id. at 27.
196 For the APEC CBPRs, a single company negotiates the code with the Accountability
Agent. See supra Part IV.B. The Dutch codes are negotiated by trade associations
representing companies from the same sector. See Hirsch, Going Dutch, supra note 116, at
89.
197 See generally Privacy, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
category/privacy (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
198 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 63, at 24.
199 Id. at 27.
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more practical than direct regulation, and more effective than self-regulation. At
what level should they regulate? They should regulate at the level of the
industry sector and not at the level of the firm or of the economy as a whole.
The three existing cross-border privacy rule initiatives-the U.S.-E.U. Safe
Harbor Agreement, the E.U.'s Binding Corporate Rules program, and the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation's Cross-border Privacy Rules initiative-
utilize a form of co-regulation, but do so at the level of the firm or of the
economy as a whole. This weakens these programs. Governments and industry
should experiment with sector-based co-regulation as a supplement to the
existing initiatives.
Part V showed that it may be possible to implement such a system. E.U. and
APEC privacy rules may overlap sufficiently to allow a single code to satisfy
both regimes. In addition, the E.U. and APEC systems each include code
approval mechanisms that could, with some important modifications, serve as
the basis for approving and enforcing sector-based codes that bridge these two
regional initiatives. While this solution may be within reach, governments will
need to take additional steps to achieve it. This Article further recommends that:
* The E.U. retain Article 27 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, which
allows the Article 29 Working Group to approve sector-based codes
and create a legal safe harbor with respect to all E.U. member state data
protection laws.200
* If the E.U. adopts the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), then
it should retain Article 38 of the proposed GDPR, which allows the
Commission to approve sector-based data protection codes, and so
create a legal safe harbor with respect to the GDPR.201
* APEC should authorize Accountability Agents to approve sector-based
codes, not just those that individual companies submit.
* APEC should further define and strengthen the safe harbor that an
approved code creates with respect to the national data protection laws
of APEC member states. Doing so will increase firms' incentive to
participate in the APEC CBPR system.
* If the U.S. Congress passes comprehensive privacy legislation it should
include a safe harbor program for industry sectors.202 This would not
only provide a useful, additional tool for U.S. privacy regulation. As set
out in this Article, it would also provide a mechanism by which the
United States could approve sector-based codes and so, potentially,
harmonize its privacy rules with those of the E.U. and the other APEC
200 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 27 (explaining how approval of sector-based
codes is related to creating a safe harbor).20 1Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 38.
202 See, e.g., S. 799, 112th Cong. § 501 (2011) (proposing such a safe harbor program);
Dennis D. Hirsch & Ira Rubinstein, Better Safe than Sorry: Designing Effective Safe Harbor
Programs for Effective Consumer Privacy Legislation, 10 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA)
1639 (Nov. 14, 2011) (making specific recommendations on how to design such a safe
harbor program).
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member states. This is a powerful reason to pass such legislation and to
build a safe harbor program into it.
Government adoption of these recommendations would establish a
workable system of cross-border privacy rules to govern data flows across all
E.U. and APEC member states. Such a system would incorporate the twenty-
eight E.U. member nations, as well as the United States, Canada, Japan, China,
and other APEC countries. Taken together, these steps would bring us closer to
that Holy Grail of contemporary privacy law: unified, clear, protective, and
effective international privacy rules.
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APPENDIX
Table 3 with Supporting Citations: Substantive Overlap
E.C. 1995 E.U. General APEC Privacy U.S. Commercial Privacy
Requirements Directive Regulation Principles Bill of Rights Act
Transparency ofData / 203 / 204 / 205 / 206
Practices
Choice/Consent / 207 / 208 / 209 / 210
Legitimate Bases (Other / 211 / 212 213 / 214
than Consent)
Security Safeguards / 215 / 216 / 217 / 218
Accuracy / 219 / 220 / 221 / 222
Access / 223 / 224 / 225 / 226
Correction / 227 228 / 229 230
PurposeLimit on Use / 231 9 232 / 233 / 234
203 1995 Directive, supra note 47, arts. 10, 18-19,21.
204 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, arts. 5(a), 11.205 APEC Framework, supra note 136, paras. 15-17, at 12-13.
206 S. 799, 112th Cong. §201(a) (2011).
207 1995 Directive, supra note 47, arts. 7(a) (consent as general basis for legitimacy),
8(2)(a) ("explicit consent" to processing of sensitive data).
208 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 6(1)(a).209 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 20, at 17.
210 S. 799 § 202(a)(1)-(3).
211 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 7(b)-(f) (providing legitimate bases for
processing other than the data subject's consent to such processing).
212 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 6(1)(b)-(f).2 13 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 19, at 16-17.214 S. 799 § 202(a)(3)(A).
215 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 17 (providing "appropriate technical and
organizational measures to protect personal data").2 16 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 30.2 17 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 22, at 21.
218 S. 799 § 101.
219 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(1)(d).
220 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(d).22 1 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para 21, at 20.
222 S. 799 § 303.
223 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 12(a).
224 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 15.225 APEC Framework, supra note 136, paras. 23-25, at 22-24.
226 S. 799 § 202(a)(4)(A).
227 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 12(b).
228 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 16.229 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 23(c), at 22.
230 S. 799 § 202(a)(4)(B).
231 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(l)(b).
232 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(b).
2013] 1067
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Requirements E.C. 1995 E.U. General APEC Privacy U.S. Commercial Privacy
Directive Regulation Principles Bill of Rights Act
Sensitive Data / 235 / 236 (/)237 / 238
Accountability / 239 / 240 / 241
Purpose Limit on 242 243 244 245
Collection /_244_245
Data Minimization / 246 / 247 / 248
Fair and Lawful / 249 / 250 / 251
Retention and Disposal / 252 / 253 / 254
Privacy by Design / 255 / 256
Prior Check /257 258
Right To Object / 259 / 260
Automated Decisions / 261 / 262
2 33 See APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 19, at 16.
234 S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 202(b), 302 (2011).
235 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 8(1).
236 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 9.2 37 By requiring that privacy protections be proportionate to the threatened harm
associated with the collection and use of the personal information in question, this provision
implicitly differentiates between sensitive personal data (where the threat of harm is great)
and other personal information. See APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 14, at 11.
238 S. 799 § 202(a)(3)(A).
239 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 22.
24 0 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 26, at 28.
241 S. 799 § 102.
242 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(l)(b).
243 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(b).
244 APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 18, at 15.
245 S.799 301(1) (providing that entities shall "collect only as much covered
information" as is reasonably necessary to accomplish a list of objectives such as prevent or
detect fraud, investigate a possible crime, etc.).
246 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(l)(c).
247 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(c).
248 S. 799 § 301.
249 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(1)(a).
250 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(a).
2 5 1APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 18, at 15.
252 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 6(1)(e).
253 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 5(e).
254 S. 799 § 301(2).
255 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 23.
256 S. 799 § 103.
257 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 20 (requiring that authority conduct prior check of
operations "likely to present specific risks" to data subjects).
258 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 34.
259 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 14 (providing that data subject can object based
on "compelling legitimate grounds").
260 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 19.
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E.C. 1995 E.U. General APEC Privacy U.S. Commercial Privacy
Requirements Directive Regulation Principles Bill of Rights Act
Notification to Data / 263 / 264
Subject
Children's Data
Requires Parent's / 265 (/) 266
Consent
Data Protection by / 267
Default
Privacy Impact / 268
Assessment
Notfcation to Data 269
Protection Authority
Documentation of / 270
Processing 270
Right To Be Forgotten / 271
and to Erasure
Data Portability V/ 272
Preventing Harm ei273 s1274
Data Protection Oficer 275
Supervisory Authority /276 /277
"Adequacy" Limit for /278 27International Transfer27
261 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 15 (providing right of data subject not to be
subject to decision that significantly affects him and is based on automated data processing).
262 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 20.
263 1995 Directive, supra note 47, arts. 10-11.
264 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 14.26 5 1d. art. 8.
266 This requirement is included in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998, which would operate alongside comprehensive policy legislation similar to the
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011 if Congress were to pass such legislation.
See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §
6502(b)(1) (2012).
267 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 23(2).268 1d. art. 22(2)(c).
269 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 18.
270 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 28.27 1Id. art. 17.
272Id. art. 18.27 3APEC Framework, supra note 136, para. 14, at 11 (requiring the privacy protections
be designed to prevent harm to individuals, and should be proportionate to the degree of
harm threatened by the collection and use of the information in question).
274 S. 799, 112th Cong. § 202(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2011) (requiring opt-in consent for the use of
previously collected information or the transfer of information to a third party for an
unauthorized use if the "use or transfer creates a risk of economic or physical harm to an
individual").
275 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, arts. 22(2)(e), 35-37.
276 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 28.
277 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 46.
278 1995 Directive, supra note 47, art. 25.
279 Proposed General Regulation, supra note 174, art. 41.
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